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Abstract
Upstream producers that possess market power, sell forwards with a
lengthy duration to regional electricity companies (REC). As part of the
liberalization of the electricity market, RECs have been privatized and
exposed to a possible bankruptcy threat if spot prices have fallen below
their expected value. The downstream firms’ expected profit is larger,
when it is less likely to be bailed out, the effect on upstream profits is
ambiguous while consumers loose. Options are less welfare increasing than
forwards, but the difference is minimal. In the presence of bankruptcy,
options are the preferred welfare maximizing market instrument.
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1 Introduction
Motivation
The European Commission and the USA want to regulate the off-market
trade of derivatives that covers 592,000 billion US-$. This reform is one of
the largest tasks for governments and regulators to come. After the insurance
company American International Group (AIG) had to be backed up by the US
government, due to its risky bets with derivatives in September 2008, the USA
and Europe have been working on stricter regulations. Fundamental elements
of the reform are Central Counter Parties (CCPs) that take over the risk in
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case of liquidity shortages. According to EU and US regulatory suggestions,
standardized derivative contracts need to go through CCPs. Derivatives of this
kind are often used by energy producers. Thus, it is not surprising that Eon,
one of Europe’s largest electricity and gas suppliers claims that it needs an
additional 7.5 billion US$ in capital, when the CCP requirements are enforced.
(Financial Times, 7/10/ 2009).
This paper is a first attempt to evaluate defaults and forwards in the pres-
ence of an upstream oligopoly and downstream firms, operating in a competitive
environment. In addition to potential government bailouts, the model shows
that welfare decreases for another reason: the threat of market exit through
insolvency affects the market equilibrium in itself. If an upstream oligopolist
has sold forwards to a downstream firm, and the spot price has unexpectedly
fallen, then the downstream firm might not be able to discharge its payment
obligations to the oligopolist. An oligopolist reduces this risk by increasing the
spot price, which has an immediate negative effect on customers. This model is
applied to the electricity sector, and uses parameters that are based on historic
data from England and Wales. It is based on regional electricity companies
(RECs) that purchase electricity from oligopolistic generators. Before liberaliz-
ation took place, RECs had local monopolies to supply residential customers.
The interaction between producers and RECs takes place on a contract and spot
market.
Literature
The market environment of this model can be well framed into a branch of
the industrial organization literature that was initiated by Allaz and Villa (1993)
[AV], and is summarized in the following. AV’s influential article shows that the
presence of a contract market increases welfare, because the competition among
firms is intensified. It creates a prisoner’s dilemma, in which firms voluntarily
sell forward some of their production on the contract market. Once they have
engaged on the contract market, they find it profitable to extend production
on the spot market; the marginal revenue increases with the amount that has
been contracted before. Sustaining from contracting is a dominated strategy,
because the other firm could increase its profits by writing contracts alone, to
then become the Stackelberg leader of the game.
Mahenc and Salanié (2004) [MS] challenge the view that contract markets
increase welfare. If risk neutral producers are allowed to buy their own quantity
on the contract market, then it is a dominant strategy to do so in order to
increase prices on the spot market. The intuition here is that producers want
to increase their profits on the contract market, by increasing the spot price.
In AV, producers compete in quantities on the contract and spot market, but
in MS, producers compete in quantities on the future market and prices on the
spot market. It is a necessary assumption that the spot market is modeled as
a differentiated goods Bertrand model to ensure the strategic complementarity
of prices. Another well-known method to avoid the prisoner’s dilemma is to
increase the time horizon, either to infinity or to a finite number of periods,
where firms use trigger strategies. This has been done by Liski and Montero
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(2006) [LM], who extend the two-stage model of AV and MS to a multiple period
game with Bertrand and Cournot competition. Contracts are traded first, the
corresponding spot market takes place one period later. In their model firms can
use a trigger strategy to sustain collusion: they have to charge the monopoly
price on both markets, or the price is otherwise set equal to marginal costs for
all subsequent periods. Contract markets help to sustain collusion, because the
spot market share decreases. Furthermore firms sell more forward, when they
compete in prices, and less, when they compete in quantities to stay on the
collusion path. Le Coq (2004) exhibits similar results under a different setting.
Firms trade on the future market once. Quantities are delivered at multiple
subsequent spot markets.
Newbery (1998) introduces contracts in a supply function model, which is
more suitable to picture the electricity market. He shows that contracts that
drive down the expected spot price, reduce the incentive for competitors to
enter the market. Entry can thus be deterred, if incumbents hold sufficient
capacity; a conception first illustrated by Dixit (1980). Murphy and Smeers
(2005) [MS] introduce investment decisions in the two-markets setup. They
prove that the equilibrium of a model with, and without a contract market is
the same, when players have to choose capacities before they produce. The
intuition behind the result is the same as in the Kreps and Scheinkman (1983)
model; firms choose low capacities to avoid destructive competition and restore
the Cournot equilibrium. Bushnell (2007) extends AV’s model to n firms that
face increasing marginal costs. He demonstrates, how the equilibrium changes,
when an additional firm enters the market in the presence of a contract mar-
ket, as opposed to the change in the absence of a contract market. Grimm
and Zoettl (2006) [GZ] establish that a contract market decreases investment
capacity in a time-varying demand model. Capacity choices decrease the pos-
itive competition effect of contract markets. Firms choose lower capacities to
avoid competition, but when demand is low and capacity is not a binding con-
straint, then contracts do increase competition. Only when demand is certain
and capacity binds, then contracts do not affect the efficiency outcome. The
model of MS shows that capacity investment decisions under perfect foresight
yield the same market outcome with and without a contract market. Newbery
(2008) studies the effect of mergers in the presence of a contract market. He
demonstrates that market power increases more after a merger, when a contract
market is present. Furthermore he proves that contracts reduce capacity, which
is consistent with GZ. They also increase the fraction of time that capacity is
constrained, but still lower the time-weighted average price. The later finding
shows that future markets increase at least consumer rents, in the presence of
capacity investments, and come therefore closest to a positive contract market
welfare analysis, even in the presence of capacity constraints.
GZ and Newbery (1998) are the only papers that reasonably allude, future
markets could possible be welfare decreasing, because producers scale down their
installed capacity. All other model that claim, forwards are welfare decreasing,
rest on very strict assumptions: differentiated goods, perfect information and
collusion (LM) or allowing producers to buy forward (MS). However these as-
3
sumptions can be counteracted by a regulator, if they prove to be realistic. In
line with the majority of articles, forwards reduce the spot price in this essay,
however, the efficiency gain is lower, when buyers face an insolvency risk for low
spot prices. The models examined so far, assume "no-arbitrage profits" from
futures. They model the upstream market and assume that buyers accept any
forward price, as long as it is not below the expected spot price. In equilib-
rium, the forward price equals the spot price, an assumption that often does
not hold empirically.1 This essay models both market participants, and allows
the forward price to be different from the spot price.
The electricity sector
Few papers have studied the impact of retail competition on contracts. Ex-
ceptions are Powell (1993) and Green (2004), on which this model is closely
based. Powell shows that there are more forwards sold, when producers coordin-
ate on the forward and spot market, as opposed to a market, where producers
exclusively coordinate on the forward market. Green finds that the number of
contracts sold is higher in an industry, where an incumbent does not face any
competition (in the presence of yardstick regulation) as compared to an incum-
bent that is faced by a competitive fringe, which always charges the spot price
(in the presence of switching costs).
After the electricity sector has been liberalized, incumbent retailers have
faced fierce competition as opposed to producers, which have remained in an
oligopoly position. A famous retail bankruptcy example for the British market
is the failure of ’Independent Energy’ that collapsed in 2000. Thus, RECs have
become vulnerable to the risk of spot prices that have fallen below the expected
level at the time, when contracts were written. If they charge a retail price
that exceeds the spot price substantially, then some of their clients leave their
previous electricity supplier to be supplied by a competitive fringe, which buys
and re-sells electricity for the current spot price. Green takes account of the
market reforms and calibrates his model with historic data from the English/
Welsh electricity sector in the 1990s that this model utilizes.
In the course of the 1990 electricity market liberalization of the UK, the
RECs were privatized. They became either public limited companies (plc) or
they were bought by large domestic producers (e.g. Powergen and Scottish
Power) and foreign firms (e.g. Eon and EDF). According to the Utilities Act
in 2000, all former RECs had to separate their supply and distribution busi-
nesses. The forwards studied here, are "over-the-counter" (OTC) contracts
that exclusively concern the supply business part, which supplies management
services, such as billing, customer service, metering, debt collection and ad-
ministration. There is not much capital bound in the newly formed retailer’s
business, a miscalculation of past forward purchases can easily destabilize the
financial condition and force a retailer to exit the market.
Objectives
1One of the first empirical essays on this issue is Protopapadakis and Stoll (1983).
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This model does not reconstruct bankruptcy probabilities for the electri-
city market in England and Wales, it uses the noise that was generated by
its liberalization to justify the assumption that the spot market alone is af-
fected by the threat of insolvency. Before the liberalization, incumbent retailers
held monopoly positions and bankruptcies were highly unlikely. The forward
market, described in this model, has a very long time horizon, such that the lib-
eralization was not anticipated, when the contract market opened. I study the
market equilibrium, where the bankruptcy threat is anticipated, in a different
paper (Scholz, 2009). That model uses the same assumptions as the literature
described in the beginning; retailers are modeled just implicitly and buy any
number of forwards, offered by producers, but it lacks the adoptability to the
electricity market. Furthermore closed-form solutions cannot be derived, when
the default risk is endogenous. It shows that the anticipation of bankruptcy
at the closure of contracts reduces the number of contracts. This induces the
negative welfare effect of the insolvency risk to be even larger. The results
presented here, can thus be interpreted as being a conservative estimation.
Furthermore this model compares welfare effects between forwards and op-
tions. It demonstrates that options yield a slightly lower welfare, but are easily
the preferred instrument in the presence of bankruptcy. It is the first model
that allows a welfare analysis, in which forwards are compared to options, whose
strike price is endogenous. The model of this essay has two parts; the first part
(section 2) studies the impact of bankruptcy in the presence of a forward market.
The second part (section 3) compares the market equilibrium in the presence of
forwards, with the one in the presence of options. Section 4 concludes.
2 Forwards
2.1 Pre-liberalization period
There is an upstream market with producers, who sell forwards to incumbent
regional electricity companies. Producers set the price on the forward market
and the quantities on the spot market.2 RECs decide, how many forwards they
want to buy.
Producers cooperate on the forward market, but do not coordinate on the
spot market. If there was no coordination among producers on the forward mar-
ket, the price would equal marginal costs, which is unrealistic for the electricity
market. If there was coordination on the forward and spot market, such that
the total spot quantity is the monopoly quantity, then the number of contracts
increases compared to a market, where coordination is restricted to the forward
market.3 When a REC has paid a high forward price pf , and the spot price is
2Unitil 1995, the generation duopoly in the UK, even though it held less than 50% of
generation capacity, set the price 90% of the time, see Wolfram (1999). Section 2.2 explores
this issue in greater depth.
3The proofs are given in Powell (1993) on p. 449-450.
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unexpectedly low, then the REC makes a loss. The more contracts have been
traded in the past, the larger the loss and the bankruptcy probability; a positive
correlation of these two variables is assumed. Thus if producers cooperate on
the spot market, retailers would have bought more contracts, and the default
probability would be even larger. The results presented here, can then again be
interpreted, as being a conservative estimation.
2.1.1 Production sector
Producers maximize their expected profits EπP , while RECs maximize a mean-
variance utility function of their profit πR. There are two symmetric producers
and RECs, such that in equilibrium the production quantity of producer i equals
that of producer j and the number of forwards sold to each REC is equal. Call
fi(fj) the number of forwards sold by producer i (j) and purchased by REC i
(j).4 The game is solved by backward induction. When producers set their spot
market quantities, they do so given the number of forwards f sold. Producers
maximize their expected profits, as they face an uncertain demand. Producer
i0s objective is
max
Eqi
EπP = (Ep− c)Eqi − fi(Ep− pf ) + Cov(p, qi) (1)
where qi is the spot quantity of producer i, c is marginal cost and pf is the
forward price. The first part of (1) is the spot market profit, and the second the
contract market profit. Cov(p, q) is the constant covariance of the spot price
and quantity. The linear inverse residual demand function with an intercept A
and slope −b can be expressed as
p = A− bqi − bqj +  (2)
where  ∼ N(0, σ2). All customers that do not pay the retail price are described
by the term "residual"; in particular large industrial customers, who can buy
electricity from the production sector directly. It is straightforward to solve (1)
for the expected spot quantity of producer i;
Eqi =
A− c+ 2bfi − bfj
3b
. (3)
As producers are symmetric, the expected spot price is
Ep =
A+ 2c− bfi − bfj
3
(4)
As mentioned before, producers set the forward price and maximize their ob-
jective accordingly.
max
pf
EπP = (Ep− c)Eq − f(Ep− pf ) + Cov(p, q) (5)
4 In Germany RECs (“Stadtwerke”) often still buy all electricity exclusively from one gen-
erator, even though they are not owned by them anymore.
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The first order condition of (5) can be solved for pf
pf = Ep+
µ
∂fi
∂pf
¶−1 ∙
fi − (Eqi − fi)
∂Ep
∂pf
− (Ep− c)∂Eqi
∂pf
¸
(6)
Powell (1993) shows that the forward price is larger than the expected spot
price. The capacity literature can be viewed parallel to this observation; in order
to mitigate the negative effect of forwards on their market power, producers
charge a higher price than Ep, whereas in the capacity literature, incumbents
might have an incentive to over-invest in capacity as a strategic device; see
Spence (1977), Dixit (1980) and Newbery (1998) as a more recent application
to the electricity market. In order to find ∂f∂pf , RECs are modeled that choose
the optimal number of contracts, given the forward price that is offered by the
production sector.
2.1.2 Retail sector
A fix number of customers served by an incumbent REC, V purchases electricity
for a regulated price r before the market was reformed.
The two RECs that have been characterized by subindexes i and j in the last
section, operate in separate markets but are symmetric. In reality there were 12,
and not two heterogeneous risk averse RECs in England and Wales; cooperation
would thus have been very difficult to implement, and is not assumed in this
model. A REC maximizes a mean-variance function applied to its profit as in
Powell (1993),
Ui = E(πRi )−
1
2
λV ar(πRi ) (7)
where the expected profit is
E(πRi ) = V [r −E(p)] + fi[E(p)− pf ] (8)
The variance is V ar(πR) = V ar[V (r − p) + fi(p − pf )] = V ar[p(fi − V )] =
(V −fi)2σ2, where the only variable part is the price. RECs choose the optimal
number of contracts, they purchase. REC i0s objective is max
fi
Ui = E(πRi ) −
1
2λV ar(π
R
i ), which is solved for fi
fi = V +
E(p)− pf
λσ2 − [∂E(p)/∂fi]
(9)
(4) is used to manipulate (9), in order to derive REC i0s demand for contracts
as a function of the number of contracts bought by the other REC.
fi(fj) =
V (b+ 3λσ2) +A+ 2c− fj − 3pf
2b+ 3λσ2
(10)
Due to symmetry, fi(fj) and fj(fi) solve for REC’s demand function of con-
tracts, given the forward price:
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f(pf ) =
V (b+ 3λσ2) +A+ 2c− 3pf
3(b+ λσ2)
(11)
Equation (6) and (11) can be solved for the optimal number of forwards,
f∗i = f
∗
j = f
∗, based on the underlying parameters. The derivatives in (6) can
easily be derived, using (3), (4) and (11).
f∗ =
V ( b3 + λσ
2)− 19(A− c)
10
9 b+ 2λσ
2
(12)
Furthermore the first order condition of pf , (6) is solved with (3), (4), (11)
and (12) to express pf based on the expected spot price and the number of
contracts signed
pf = Ep+
1
9
(A− c) + f∗(7
9
b+ λσ2) (13)
This shows that the forward price exceeds the level of the expected spot
price. The difference increases with the risk aversion parameter. Even for
λ = 0, the forward price exceeds the expected price, because contracts decrease
future spot prices (see also Powell, 1993). The demand for contracts decreases
with the number of contracts the other REC purchases, (10), which is a justified
result, as RECs were of considerable size. The larger the demand elasticity, the
more RECs hedge, because the negative impact on the spot price per forward
contract, increases with b. (see (4)) Another reason for price divergence is the
large percentage of OTC trade in the electricity sector, which implicates non-
transparent pricing.5
2.2 Post liberalization period
Since the market was reformed, residential customers have been able to choose
their electricity supplier. If a customer chooses to find a new supplier in this
model, then she would receive her electricity from the competitive fringe. Cos-
tumers are assumed to face switching costs, such that some are willing to remain
with their regional electricity company and pay a higher price.
The market share of the incumbent retailer decreases, when the retail price,
which is assumed not to be regulated after liberalization, is above the current
spot price. Green’s (2004) simple demand expression that an incumbent retailer
faces, after a competitive fringe has entered the market, is also useful for this
work
V NEW = V − h(r − p) (14)
A high constant parameter h is interpreted by low switching costs. When switch-
ing costs are low, the incumbent’s market share decreases more for (r− p) > 0.
5 In Germany for instance the liberalization of the electricity market has not yet reached
the same level as in the UK, because RECs (“Stadtwerke”) still hold both: distribution
and supply. Over 80% of electricity is sold through bilateral contracts, most with a single
incumbent generator based on historical ties. Due to commercial confidentiality, neither price
nor quality information are revealed. (WIK, 2008)
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2.2.1 Retail sector
The former RECs are allowed to choose the retail price r, which has been dic-
tated by a regulator before the liberalization. Thus the new retail objective
becomes
max
r
πR = V NEW (r − p) + f(p− pf ) (15)
The optimal new retail price is
r∗ = p+
V
2h
(16)
There is no expectation operator in (15), because retailers know the realiz-
ation of , when they choose r∗. In the past, forward contracts were written to
protect RECs from volatile pool prices, because they had to sell into a regulated
market with a formerly fix retail price. After the liberalization, this alleged pro-
tection has jeopardized retailers that now have to act in a volatile retail price
environment. Meanwhile the market has become more competitive and retailers
have to carry the burden of contracts. This model assumes that there is a posit-
ive probability of bankruptcy, when a retailer incurs a loss based on the contract
of differences. The return of forwards is negative, when the spot price is below
the forward price, otherwise contracts yield positive returns. If p < pf the situ-
ation worsens with low switching costs (large h), because in that case, retailers
can just charge a low mark-up, see (16). The bankruptcy probability consists of
an exogenous part s, which contains information about its ownership structure,
how likely the retailer is able to raise loans from banks, and how much savings it
holds. Incumbent retailers might also be bailed out by their owners, when these
are able to raise sufficient funds. Owners are generally less willing to vouch
for the retailers, when the loss −πR is very large, which is incorporated in the
bankruptcy probability. But there are also different warrantors as such; public
entities are generally more willing to burn (taxpayer’s) money than private en-
tities, to preserve trust. In the English/ Welsh market all RECs were bought
by private companies, some of them very large and operating worldwide, thus
they would be reluctant not to act as a guarantor for their retailer, registered
as public limited company, to maintain their reputation. The different owner
types are expressed by the exogenous multiplier s. Thus the default probability
is defined as
α = α(sπR) = 0 if π
R > 0
−sπR if πR < 0 (17)
The survival probability is denoted by η(πR) = 1− α(πR). If a retailer has
a low s then it is owned by an entity that is more likely to guarantee for its
retailer’s payments, when πR < 0. If πR is positive, then the bankruptcy threat
is absent, α = 0 and η = 1. If bankruptcy occurs or not, is irrelevant in this
model; it is the risk that affects the spot market equilibrium.
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2.2.2 Production sector
The retailer’s ownership structure is known in the UK, hence s can be estimated.
Furthermore the number of contracts can be assessed, based on the market that
the former REC operated, allowing the probability of default to be derived.
Producers maximize their expected profit by choosing an optimal production
quantity, where the expectation is based on, how likely it is that the retailer
manages to transfer pf − p, for the contracts signed. There is no uncertainty
about the demand intercept at this stage. If a retailer fails, contracts become
worthless, but producers still sell an unconstraint quantity on the spot market.
The residual demand is not affected by bankruptcy, because there are other
generators that can absorb customers from bankrupt, incumbent retailers. The
generation capacity of the duopoly, which covered 73% of total capacity in 1990-
91 decreased to 46% in 1995-96 and an estimated 38% in 2000-01 (Monopolies
and Merger Commission, 1996). But until 1995, the duopoly set the pool’s
electricity price 90% of the time, which justifies this model’s assumption that
the duopoly sets a quantity that reflects the market price.6
max
qi
EπPi = pqi − cqi − fi(p− pf )ηi(πRi ) (18)
To find the spot quantity of (18), a function is maximized that depends on
the optimal outcome, as πR(q) is a function of q = (qi, qj). The optimal value
of q is found by solving two separate maximization problems with η(πR) < 1
and η(πR) = 1 respectively, because η(πR) is not continuous. Define πP,B(qB)
to be the producer’s objective, when η(πR) < 1 and πP,NB(qNB) the objective,
when η(πR) = 1.7 qB∗ and qNB∗ are the corresponding optimal values, which
are compared in the four different equilibria, possible;
1. qmax = qB∗ if EπP,B(qB∗) > πP,NB(qNB∗) and EπR(qB∗) < 0.8
2. qmax = qNB∗ if πP,NB(qNB∗) > EπP,B(qB∗) EπR(qB∗) > 0.
3. πP,NB(qNB∗) > EπP,B(qB∗) and πR(qNB∗) < 0: when this outcome oc-
curs, producers prefer that retailers have a zero probability to go bust.
If πP,NB(qNB∗) + πR,NB(qNB∗) > EπP,B(qB∗) + EπR,B(qB∗), producers
and retailers might consider to either merge or renegotiate their contracts.
4. EπP,B(qB∗) > πP,NB(qNB∗) and πR(qB∗) > 0: In this case producers
rather maximize the objective when their retailers could possibly default.
Producers produce qmax = qNB as they cannot force retailers to go bank-
rupt, when πR(qB∗) > 0. Furthermore computing EπP,B(qB∗) does not
make sense, because one would assume that η > 1. Thus this equilibrium
is not realistic.
6For background information see Wolfram (1999) and Newbery (1995, 1998).
7Throughout the rest of this chapter, the superscript B stands for, "there exists a bank-
ruptcy risk", and NB stands for, "there exists no bankruptcy risk".
8The expectation operator for profits applies to the B- case only, because there is no
uncertainty, when retailers cannot possible go bankrupt.
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2.2.3 For a retailer’s survival probability of η(πR) < 1
First, the optimal spot market quantity is solved, which is set by producers.
When an incumbent retailer goes bust, then the producer does not receive the
forward price for the contract coverage, but sells to customers directly or through
the competitive fringe. A retailer is threatened by a loss when p ¿ pf , where
the price difference has to be sufficient, because retailers realize a profit from
those customers who do not switch, and pay a retail price above the spot price,
see (16). After the bankruptcy of a retailer, whom a producer has written
contracts with, the positive transfer of f(p− pf ) would not be obtained. Thus
producers minimize the default risk, by keeping the spot price up. (15) and (17)
are converted, to rewrite the producer’s profit as a function of the retailer loss
πP,B1 = (p− c)q1 − f1(p− pf )
©
1 + s
£
V (r∗ − p) + f1(p− pf )
¤ª
The first term is the spot market profit, the second term is the expected contract
market return. The later simple contains the survival probability, η(πR) as a
multiplier. Substituting r∗
πP,B1 = (p− c)q1 − f1(p− pf )
½
1 + s
∙
V 2
4h
+ f1(p− pf )
¸¾
The spot price p contains A∗ = A+ . The demand is known at this point
and producers play the Cournot game on the spot market. At the contract
market though conjectural variations ∂fi∂fj are assumed to equal zero.
∂πP,B
∂qi
= A∗ − 2bqi − bqj − c + bfi
n
1 + sV
2
4h + sfi
£
(A∗ − bqi − bq2)− pf
¤o
+
sbf2i
£
(A∗ − bqi − bqj)− pf
¤ .
= 0
The foc can be rewritten for identical retailers and producers, fi = fj = f and
qBi = q
B
j = q
B
qB∗ =
A∗ − c+ bf
³
1 + sV
2
4h
´
+ 2sbf2(A∗ − pf )
3b+ 4sb2f2
(19)
If qB∗ is realized, then the spot price is equal to
pB∗ = A∗ − 2bqB∗ =
A∗ + 2c− bf
³
2 + sV
2
2h
´
+ 4sbf2pf
3 + 4sbf2
(20)
(20) is the optimal production quantity, when bankruptcy is possible. One
can substitute (12), (16), (19) and (20) in (15) and (18) to derive πR(qB∗) and
EπP (qB∗) that only depend on the underlying parameters of the model. If
πR < 0 and πP,B(qB∗) > πP,NB(qNB∗), then it is for generators optimal to take
the risk, that incumbent retailers are exposed to the bankruptcy threat.
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2.2.4
2.2.5 For a retailer’s survival probability of η(πR) = 1
If a former REC realizes a profit, then it survives by definition and the survival
probability equals one. Again, producers play the Cournot game on the spot
market, while conjectural variations at the forward market are zero. The equi-
librium is described through (3) and (4), where A is substituted for the realized
intercept A∗.
πR(qAV ∗) and πR(qAV ∗) can thus also be expressed by the model’s paramet-
ers. When πR > 0 and πP,C(qC∗) < π(qAV ∗), generators choose a spot quantity
such that the incumbent retailer survives with certainty.
2.3 Results
This section presents a numerical solution of this model, based on data of the
electricity sector in England and Wales. In the early 1990s, there was a gen-
eration duopoly, and there were 12 incumbents in the retail sector. The two
privatized firms, National Power and Powergen, held respectively 50% and 30%
of the total generation capacity. The Electricity Supply Industry in England and
Wales was reformed in 1990. Before its restructuring took place, there had been
a state-owned Central Electricity Generating Board, responsible for generation
and transmission, selling to 12 state-owned Area Electricity Boards, which were
responsible for distribution. Nearly 80% of the industry’s generation came from
coal-fired stations, and most of the remaining electricity from nuclear power.
Green’s (2004) parameter values are applied in this model. He assumes mar-
ginal cost c being equal to £20/ MWh. The parameters of the residual demand
curve are set to A = 50 and b = 23 .
The welfare analysis, which is conducted later, estimates the consumer sur-
plus based on "residual" demand.9 Customers that remained with the incum-
bent are ignored, because this is not a general welfare analysis of the liberaliz-
ation process as such. This model rather analyzes, how the bankruptcy aspect
affects the market equilibrium. In the 1990s, there were already some small
generators on the market, which were price takers. Therefore the profit and
expected profit that are derived are "residuals", too.
Green sets the sales volume per REC to V=2.5 GW representing the total
sales to small customers of the 12 RECs equal to 30 GW. There are two re-
tailers in this model; each writes contracts with one generator, nevertheless the
same volume per REC of V=2.5 GW is adopted, as it can be shown that even
with a relatively small contract coverage, the market equilibrium is changed by
the risk of default, significantly. This makes this model’s findings even more
meaningful. The switching cost parameter is set to h = 0.15, because incum-
bents lost approximately one third of their market share or 0.9 GW of sales due
9 In addition to consumer rents, welfare includes expected producer and retailer profits.
Consumer rents equal the area between the inverse demand function and the spot price.
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to a 10% retail price difference at that time, when the retail price was around
£60/MWh. Green claims that the variance of the annual pool’s price, σ2 = 5.76
(from 01/1990 to 01/2000) was distinctively low, because of high level contract-
ing, market power and regulatory pressure. It is contrary to the volatility in
Nordic countries, which depend heavily on rainfall, due to the importance of
hydro power plants. There, the variance was equal to 34.9 between 1993 and
2003. A volatility of somewhere in between is used; σ2 = 30. Green derives a
risk aversion parameter of λ = 0.178.10
The default probability consists of the retailer’s profit πR and the exogenous
parameter s.11 In the first numerical simulation, which is summarized by figure
1, the intercept is 20% below the expected value, thus  = −10. In order to
analyze bankruptcy, it must occur with positive probability. Accordingly, the
necessary condition is that retailers incur a loss. Instead of choosing a small
, one could have lowered switching costs though increasing h. Former RECs
make a small profit, when the switching parameter is lifted from h = 0.15 to
h = 0.14. Thus in the absence of the unexpected market entry, RECs would
have never had to face a loss, which justifies the assumption that default was
never contemplated, when the contracts were signed. Finally s , the multiplier
of πR for πR < 0 is chosen to arrive at the bankruptcy probability α. This
essay is not interested in finding a potential default rate of former UK RECs,
however in the question, how the market equilibrium is affected, when different
s-parameters are considered. Different values of s are chosen that determine a
reasonably bankruptcy rate α.
In this setup, the number of forwards is not affected by the default probabil-
ity. It is just the production quantity that producers can influence. The number
of contracts has already been chosen before market entry took place, when RECs
made profits even when the spot price was below the forward price. Based on
the underlying parameters, the expected price is Ep = 29.59 by (4) and the op-
timal number of contracts f∗ = 0.93, see (12). Thus 37% of total expected sales
are bought on the forward market for a forward price of pf = 38.35, see (13).
One can alter the multiplier s to show, how total welfare, producer profits, α
and thus the retailer’s loss are affected. When s = 0, then qB∗ = qNB∗, because
the objective (18) reduces to objective (1). When the exogenous multiplier s
of the bankruptcy probability α(πR∗) increases by some percentage, then the
default probability strictly increases by less or even decreases, as long as b < 1.
Producers lower the difference of pf and p by increasing p, (which lowers the
retailer’s loss) to scale down the probability that retailers fail. The intuition
behind this result is simple; when a retailer goes bust, producers do not receive
the transfer from contracts.
The expected producer profit increases with s as the spot price goes up.
The retailer’s expected loss is largest when s = 0 and EπR = −0.775. Retailers
10Green (2004) applies Grinold (1996)’s “grapes from wine” method, pp. 16-17.
11 In order to derive profits and consumer surplus in monetary values one multiplies the
values we derive by 8.780 million. Prices are in MWh and based on hourly consumption, while
V is an annual capacity measured in GW. 1 GW annual capacity of electricity is equivalent
to 8,780 GWh and 1 GWh=1000 MWh.
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break even at s ≈ 0.195, where producers have their largest profit of EπP = 79.1
up by 4.5% compared to its profit at s = 0. The bankruptcy probability reaches
its peak for intermediate values of s. Total expected welfare, consisting of
consumer surplus, producer and incumbent retail profits decreases from 291.5
to 283.1, when s increases from zero to 0.195 (and α = 0 for the second time
after s = 0) at the expense of the residual consumer surplus that decreases
when p goes up. Thus a producer prefers a less solvent retailer, as producers
are then committed to set a lower production quantity to keep the possible loss
from retailers low. This has been the realization of equilibrium 1 at each data
point on the left hand side of the gray vertical line. Equilibrium 4, which is not
reasonable in reality occurs to the right of the vertical line. Next, examples for
equilibrium 3, which is realized when  is smaller, are demonstrated.
The parameters of the simulation that figure 2 is based on are the same
as before, except that  = −15 (upper part) and  = −25 (lower part). In
the upper part of figure 2, one can notice again that α is a concave function
of s. Producers reduce the spot price when they face a less solvent retailer to
increase the probability that they receive a payment when  < 0 and pf À p.
Retailers benefit from increasing s, thus less solvent retailers have a lower loss.
Producers do not benefit from low retailer reserves. πP,B(qB∗) falls with s up
to a level where s = 0.12, which is equivalent to a bankruptcy probability of
20%. The sum of expected producer and retailer profits is illustrated. It is
a convex increasing function of s. The sum decreases with s for small s and
increases once s ≈ 0.04, which corresponds to α ≈ 9%. Thus in a range of s ∈
(0, 0.04], producers and retailers prefer to merge, as EπP,B(qB∗)+EπR(qB∗) <
πP,NB(qNB∗) + πR∗(qNB∗), which is equilibrium 3.
The lower part of figure 2, where  is even smaller, shows that for any α > 0
or s > 0, the sum of the retail profit and expected producer profit is lower as
when α = 0 and s = 0. Thus a merger might always be a preferable solution.
It is straightforward to derive the solution for asymmetric retailers with respect
to h and s. A producer, who has written contracts with a retailer that is less
likely to be bailed out (high s), or one that has customers that are more likely to
switch (high h), is more prepared to adjust the spot price downward. The other
producer increases its production quantity, due to the strategic substitutability.
Accordingly, the profit of the producer with the more solvent retailer, rises,
while that of its competitor falls. The same holds for producers, who wrote
contracts with retailers that used to cover a larger market or were more risk
averse. These retailers purchased larger stakes in production plants and hold
more forwards; thus they are more exposed to the risk of low spot prices today.
3 Options
’Contracts for differences’ (CfDs) are pure financial contracts that resemble two-
way forward contracts, which have been examined in section 2. One-way CfDs,
which are call options are examined next. The first type has been studied by a
broad literature mentioned in the introduction, the second type only by very few
15
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authors. This model demonstrates, how options can reduce market power, just
in the same way, as two-way contracts can. Retailers do not transfer (pf − p)f ,
when the spot price p is low, thus they have the advantage that an incumbent
retailer cannot be underbid by a competitive fringe, which might enter the
market after privatization takes place. When the spot price is low, the option
holder purchases its demand at the spot market, when the price is high, the
option holder pays the lower strike price ps. The cost of an option, paid in any
demand state, is po. Indeed if the spot price is lower than the strike price, the
REC looses po on each option bought. The option price is generally paid before
the spot market opens, thus illiquidity does not occur when the spot price is
lower than expected.12
In this section, a model is introduced that compares the market equilibrium
with forwards, to one with options. It is also shown, if welfare is higher in the
forward or option model. This is the first model that allows a welfare analysis
between an option and a forward market in the Allaz Vila (1993) framework,
where the strike price is endogenously determined. Vázquez et al. (2002) pro-
pose options as a long-term security of supply mechanism. Few papers have
compared welfare effects between markets that use options and those that use
forwards. Exceptions are Chao/ Wilson and Willems (both 2004). The first of
the two papers proposes
“an annual auction of a specified quantity of multi-year option con-
tracts at each strike price in a specified range. Each contract is an
option on physical capacity since it requires the supplier to back the
contract with available capacity, to submit a standing bid at the ISO
for the contracted quantity at a price no higher than the strike price,
and to be dispatchable for either energy or reserve capacity.” (p.3)
Willems took the idea of using auctions and embedded this into a model
that can be compared to the AV model. Willems introduced an exogenous
strike price and retrieved the following results from his model: When the strike
price is above the Cournot price, options are out of money and the producers
settle at the Cournot equilibrium. For strike prices below the spot price achieved
in AV, the AV price is achieved. For intermediate strike prices, producers flood
the market until the market price reaches the strike price. The main result of
Willems (2004) was that the market price is never lower in an option market
than in a forward market. This model supports this view, but shows that if a
model is extended by a possible bankruptcy threat, an option market is preferred
to a forward market from a welfare perspective.
One needs to make some changes to the setup, to be able to compare the
option with the forward market, while keeping it simple. If one continues to
use an  ∼ N(0, σ2), the spot price, strike price and the optimal number of
12Schmidt (1997) shows that liquidation risk increases managerial incentives. If a firm would
have had a low liquidity in the past, previous payments would have increased managerial
incentives. Hence generally payments, made in the past are less harmful to a firm as they
could be balanced through managerial effort in consecutive periods.
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contracts would depend on the probability Pr(p > po) and its derivative with
respect to these variables. To avoid the resulting complications that do not
add further insight to our questions, it helps to assume that  takes on discrete
values, which act as demand shocks;  ∈ {0,H} with probabilities φ for  = H
and (1−φ) for  = 0. Thus E = φH and V ar() = σ2 = φ(1−φ)H2. If the risk
aversion parameter in (12) is set equal to zero, the optimal number of forwards
becomes: f∗ = 3V b−(A−c)10b . Just for 3V b = A− c, f∗ = 0 otherwise hedging still
takes place; there are short hedges when 3V b > A − c and long hedges when
3V b < A − c. Powell (1993) shows that in the absence of risk aversion and
when generators sell the monopoly quantity on the spot market; f∗ = 12V > 0,
which implies that there is always short, never long hedging. Meaning even risk
neutral RECs hedge to keep the future spot price low, assuming that they are
not too small in relative size to the market. It is legitimate to assume that RECs
buy contracts to lower the future spot price, as their size was significant in the
UK, before they were privatized. Producers coordinate on the future market as
before. This model has two parts again. First, the market equilibrium before
the liberalization is solved, second, it is modified to account for bankruptcy
after the liberalization. The first part of the model is solved for producers that
coordinate on the spot market, as only then the number of forwards and options
is guaranteed to be positive. For a study on market power of UK’s generation
duopoly, see Wolfram (1999).13 The equilibrium is shown, when there is no
coordination likewise. After the liberalization of the market, producers do not
coordinate, as they did in section 2. The liberalization of the electricity market
has come along with strict actions by regulators against price agreements among
incumbent generators. 14 RECs are risk neutral, λ = 0, which reduces the
demand for options and forwards in the same way, a comparison of the two
models is thus still possible. They maximize their expected profit instead of
a mean-variance utility function. First, the forward market has to be solved
under the changed market setup to be able to compare it to the option market,
then the option market is solved.
3.1 Pre-liberalization period
3.1.1 Forward Market
Production sector
Producers maximize the expected monopoly profit EπM by choosing the ex-
pected monopoly spot quantity EQ, taking the total number of forwards fΣ
as given; max
EQ
EπM = (Ep − c)EQ − fΣ(Ep − pf ) + Cov(p,Q) where Ep =
A + E − bEQ and Cov(p,Q) = σ24b . Thus the expected forward price and
monopoly quantity are
13Müsgens (2006) shows that there have been price agreements among German producers
in particular during peak periods.
14The former generation duopoly National Power and Powergen was forced to sell generation
units to reduce their market power. Finally they were bought by foreign competitors after
National Power demerged in 2001.
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Ep =
A+ φH + c− bfΣ
2
(21)
EQ =
A+ φH − c+ bfΣ
2b
(22)
The first order condition of the forward price (6), is thus
pf = Ep+
µ
∂fΣ
∂pf
¶−1 ∙
fΣ − (EQ− fΣ)
∂Ep
∂pf
− (Ep− c)∂EQ
∂pf
¸
Retail sector
RECs maximize their utility functions of the form (7) (with λ = 0) where the
foc can be solved for the number of contracts f (see (9)), which can be further
transformed to
f∗(pf ) =
V b+A+ φH + c− 2pf
3b
(23)
This is the number of forwards as a function of pf , which each REC requests.
One can now transform the pf -foc using (21), (22) and (23) to solve for the future
spot price premium,
pf −Ep = 3bfΣ
4
(24)
and the optimal number of contracts, which depends on the REC’s market size
alone
f∗Σ =
V
2
(25)
3.1.2 Option Market
Production sector
The spot price is defined to exceed the strike price, p > ps when  = H, otherwise
a REC would never want to exercise its option. Thus H must be sufficiently
large, because pf > Ep. Later it is proven that the same holds for options;
the expected unit price, covered by an option is larger than the expected spot
price: (1 − φ)pL + φps + po > Ep. RECs are willing to pay an option price
premium, just as they pay a forward price premium. In return, to receive one
unit for the lower strike price, the REC pays an option price po to the producer
in any state of the world. The total number of options sold to both RECs is oΣ.
The generator’s monopoly profit is πM = (pH − c)QH − φoΣ(pH − ps) + oΣpo
with probability φ where pH = A +H − bQH . It is πM = (pL − c)QL + oΣpo
with probability (1−φ) and pL = A− bQL, thus the expected profit function is
EπM = (Ep−c)EQ−φoΣ(pH−ps)+oΣpo+Cov(p,Q), where Ep and Cov(p,Q)
are defined in the forward model. The expected price, the corresponding spot
quantity and the high spot price are
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Ep =
A+ φH + c− φboΣ
2
(26)
EQ =
A+ φH − c+ φboΣ
2b
(27)
pH =
A+H + c− boΣ
2
(28)
Besides the spot quantity, producers choose po and ps, while RECs choose
the number of options they want to buy. The first order conditions are
∂EπM
∂po
=
∂Ep
∂po
EQ+(Ep−c)∂EQ
∂po
+
∂oΣ
∂po
£
po − φ(pH − ps)
¤
+oΣ
µ
1− φ∂p
H
∂po
¶
.
= 0
(29)
∂EπM
∂ps
=
∂Ep
∂ps
EQ+(Ep−c)∂EQ
∂ps
+
∂oΣ
∂ps
po−φ∂oΣ
∂ps
(pH−ps)+φoΣ
µ
1− φ∂p
H
∂ps
¶
.
= 0
(30)
Retail sector
RECs choose the number of options they buy, REC i0s objective (7) reduces to
max
oi
Ui = E(πRi ).
15 Retailer i0s expected profit is
EπRi = V (r −Ep) + φoi(pH − ps)− oipo (31)
The first order condition of (31) is
o1 =
V ∂Ep∂o1 + p
o − φ(pH − ps)
φ∂p
H
∂o1
(32)
As the denominator of (32) is negative, the REC’s demand for options in-
creases with pH and decreases with the strike and option price. (26)-(28) solve
for o1(o2) = 12
£
V − o2 + b−1
¡
A+H + c− 2ps − 2φ−1po
¢¤
, taking ps and po as
given. The demand for options decreases with the number of options that the
other REC buys. The public good attributes that are observed on the for-
ward market also apply to options. Due to symmetry across RECs, the optimal
number of options based on the underlying parameter set is
o(ps, po) =
1
3
£
V + b−1
¡
A+H + c− 2ps − 2φ−1po
¢¤
(33)
15 If we would allow λ > 0, the variance of the REC’s profit is (φ− φ2)[V H − o(pH − ps)]2.
The high demand price is a function of o. The derivative of V ar(πR) with respect to o depends
on cubed and quadratic oi,- and oj ,- terms, which would not allow us to have closed form
solutions.
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(26)-(28) and (33) transform (29) and (30) in order to find expressions for
ps and po, keeping in mind that oΣ = 2o(ps, po). The first order condition for
the strike price ps can be expressed as
ps(po, oΣ) =
1
4
£
2(A+H + c− 2φ−1po) + oΣ(2bφ− b)
¤
(34)
It is linearly dependent to the first order condition for the option price po
po(ps, oΣ) =
φ
4
[2(A+H + c− 2ps) + oΣ(2bφ− b)] (35)
This is not surprising as (pH − ps) is a transfer from the producer to the
REC with probability φ, and po is a transfer from the REC to the producer
with certainty, while both pairs of players are risk neutral and maximize their
expected profit, ps must be negatively correlated to po, and one variable can be
expressed through the other. One can write po(o, ps) as po(ps) using o(ps, po)
and substitute po(ps) in o(ps, po) to receive the optimal number of options o∗,
independent of po and ps, based on the underlying parameter set. po(ps) can
be transformed to
po + φps =
φ
2
(A+H + c) +
φb(2φ− 1)
2(φ+ 1)
V (36)
which is the expected option payment made to the generator, to avoid paying
pH . Adding (1−φ)pL to po+φps, gives an expected unit price; when that unit
is covered with an option. (1− φ)pL + po + φps −Ep = (4φ+1)bφV6(1+φ) > 0 does not
depend on the size of the demand shock. This corresponds to the observation,
first made by Powell (1993) for the forward market, who shows that pf > Ep,
which goes back to Allaz and Vila’s (1993) article. But so far, it has not been
shown for the option market. The reason behind this solution is the same;
forwards and options lower the expected future spot price. Substituting po in
(33) by (36) gives an expression for the optimal number of options
o∗Σ =
2
3
V
2− φ
1 + φ
(37)
There are all the ingredients, one needs to compare the expected spot price
for futures and options, stated here again for convenience: EpFutures = A+φH+c−bfΣ2
with f∗Σ =
V
2 and Ep
Options = A+φH+c−φboΣ2 . The expected spot price is larger
in the presence of options than forwards when: φo∗Σ < f
∗
Σ ⇔
2φ(2−φ)
3(1+φ) < 1, which
holds for all 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1. The expected spot price is smaller in the forward
model. For the simulation of both models, the same parameters are used as be-
fore: h = 0.15, V = 2.5, A = 50, b = 0.67 and c = 20 . The retail price did not
matter in the analysis of the first part of this article, here it equals r=£60/MWh
as in Green (2004). Furthermore the probability of a positive demand shock,
H = 20, is φ = 50%. Before the liberalization takes place, market participants
choose the values given by table 1.
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f ∗Σ , o
∗
Σ Ep p
f ,Epw. Options EQ EπM EπR E (CS)
Forwards 1.25 39.48 40.21 30.63 609.90 50.65 159.51
Options 1.6 39.72 40.00 30.42 609.73 50.23 156.31
Table 1: Welfare in the absence of bankruptcy
Welfare is hardly smaller in the one-way contract model, residual consumers
loose about 2% in expectation [E(CS)], while expected producer and REC
profits are barely different. Note that the expected price of a unit purchased
with an option is less expensive than pf , which holds when 8φ2 − 5φ − 1 < 0.
One can repeat the derivations described in this section so far, when producers
do not coordinate at the spot market. In that case, the analog equation for (36)
and (37) are
po + φps =
φ
18 + 12φ
[A (9 + 4φ) + c (9 + 8φ) +H (6 + 7φ) + V b (−3 + 4φ)]
(38)
and
o∗Σ
2
=
3V b+ c−A− φH
b(6 + 4φ)
(39)
One can easily see that there are long hedges possible, when producers do not
cooperate at the spot market and 3V b+c < A+φH. The rest of the analysis uses
the model, where producers cooperate, and shows under what circumstances a
welfare maximizing regulator prefers one-way contracts over two-way contracts,
when the default threat is included. In the absence of bankruptcy, one-way
contracts have the disadvantage that just in the high demand state, a fix price
is paid for the production that was covered. When options are “out-of-the-
money” and producers play the Cournot game. Thus intuitively it is clear, why
one-way contracts can not reduce market power to the same extend as two-way
contracts do.
3.2 Post liberalization period
This section contains the same structure previously used. After a competitive
fringe has entered the market, the new demand for incumbent retailers is (14)
as before, and the optimal retail price is (16).
Forwards
The retailer’s profit in the absence and presence of a demand shock are
πR = V4h + f
∗(pH − pf ) if  = 0
πR = V4h + f
∗(pL − pf ) if  = H (40)
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πR > 0, when  = H in the forward model, because pf > Ep > pL. Bank-
ruptcy is possible, when  = 0 in the forward model when switching costs are
low (large value of h), V is small and pL is much smaller than pf , such that
πR becomes negative. When  = H, and thus bankruptcy does not occur with
certainty, (3) and (4) continue to hold, where A is substituted by the realized
intercept A + H. Bankruptcy does not play any role. When  = L, then a
retailer’s profit is πRi =
V
4h + f
∗
i (p
L − pf ), where f∗i =
f∗Σ
2 . Each producer max-
imizes its profit, max
qLi
πPi = (p
L − c)qLi − f∗i (pL − pf )(1 + sπRi ), where (1 + sπRi )
is the survival probability of retailer i, when πRi < 0. (19) and (20) describe the
equilibrium, where the realized intercept is A∗ = A.
3.2.1 Options
The possible retail profits in the option model are
πR = V4h − o∗po if  = 0
πR = V4h + o
∗[pH − (ps + po)] if  = H (41)
When  = 0 the producer’s objective is max
qL
πP = (pL − c)qL + opo and the
equilibrium values are qL∗ = A−c3b and p
L∗ = A+2c3 . Thus producers offer the
regular Cournot price. It is a reasonable assumption that the option price has
been paid in advance, thus a possible bankruptcy does not affect the producer’s
objective. When  = H, the producer’s objective is
max
qHi
πPi = (p
H − c)qHi + oi[po + ps − pH ] (42)
If  = H , options are “in the money” and the second term of πR is strictly
positive by definition, as po + ps > pH . Otherwise the option would never be
exercised. In the preceding analysis, the relevant value has been, po+φps. The
problem was defined in such a way that options are exercised when  = H.
It would not have been a realistic assumption from the REC’s point of view,
when it would make a loss through exercising an option, when the demand is
high. Options just lower producer’s market power on the spot market if they
are exercised for  = H. If it would not be in the REC’s interest to exercise
the option, it would be known to the producers. Thus options would not reduce
market power and RECs would not purchase them in the first place.
The optimal values are qH∗ = A+H−c+bo
∗
3b and p
H∗ = A+H+2c−2bo
∗
3 , where
o∗ = oΣ2 . They have the same structure as in the Allaz Vila equilibrium. The
buyer of one-way contracts pays in either state of the world po. Thus the
difference between profit and loss is smaller with options than with forwards.
3.3 Results
There are two different equilibria for forwards and options, respectively when  =
0 and  = H. It has already been proven that forwards are preferable to options
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Figure 3: Welfare: Forwards vs. Options
in the absence of bankruptcy. After weighting the two possible outcomes of the
forward model equilibrium, one can determine, if either options or forwards are
preferable in the presence of the threat of bankruptcy.
The same parameters are used to generate figure 3, which summarizes the
main result: in the absence of a default threat (s = α = 0), the option model
yields a lower welfare than the forward model, which has been shown algeb-
raically before. But note that the welfare difference is quite small. The lower
diagram shows the relation between s and α, the upper diagram between α and
welfare.16 As the bankruptcy threat of former RECs just concerns producers in
the forward model, welfare in the option model is not affected by the exogenous
parameter s. The higher the bankruptcy probability α = −sπR becomes, the
lower the welfare in the two-way contract model just as in figure 1 and 2. For
a default probability of around 10%, a regulator that maximizes total welfare
would prefer the option model over that of the forward model. One has to bear
in mind that this estimate is very conservative, as in this model, default only
has an effect on the spot, but not contract market.
16Welfare equals the residual consumer surplus, which is the area below the inverse demand
function and above the spot price. In addition, the producer and retail profits are added.
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4 Conclusion
This paper introduces a simple model, where downstream firms, operating in
a competitive environment, may go bankrupt after incurring a loss on forward
contracts that have been signed with upstream firms. The first part of the model
shows that former RECs, which still hold long term forward contracts, benefit
when they have an owner that is less likely to bail them out. The bankruptcy
probability consists of the retailer’s loss, and an exogenous multiplier that re-
flects the willingness for bail-out of the retailer’s owner. Producers minimize
the risk of a retailer not meeting its contract of difference payments by reducing
the production quantity and hence increasing the spot price, which in return
reduces the difference. For reasonable parameters, when an owner is less likely
to bail its subsidiary out, the upward spot price shift is sufficiently large to
turn a loss (in the absence of a default threat) into a profit (in the presence
of a default threat). Depending on the extent of the upward price adoption,
producers benefit or loose. Consumers always loose more than firms gain, thus
welfare decreases.
The second part of the model introduces one-way contracts, and demon-
strates that options lower the spot price, as forwards do. In the absence of risk
aversion, the expected price of a unit that is bought with an option, exceeds
the expected price. Once again, the parallel can be drawn to the forward mar-
ket. Options reduce the profit of an upstream firm less than forwards do; thus
the spot price is larger in an option model than a forward model. The model
simulates the English/ Welsh electricity market and shows that the welfare dif-
ference is very small. Producer and retailer profits are hardly differently affected
by the instruments, and consumer surplus decreases by a mere 2%. Including
bankruptcy and comparing the option and forward model again, one-way con-
tracts are preferred to two-way contracts for bankruptcy probabilities of 10%.
If one includes other costs that are connected to bankruptcy, and considering
that this estimate is very conservative, options might quickly become preferred
to forwards.
When regulators decide how to treat off-market trade in the near future,
they shall have to keep in mind that depending on the industry structure, in-
solvency might not only cost taxpayers’ money, it may also reduce the market
power mitigating effect of two-way contracts. If two-way contracts become more
heavily regulated to avoid bankruptcies, and require a large amount of capital as
market participants claim, one-way contracts could step in, and play the same
role that forwards have done in the past.
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